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The DCFR, the ACQP and the Reactions of Italian Legal Scholars
BARBARA PASA*
Abstract: Italian commentators welcome the promotion of the Europeanization of Pri-
vate Law through the process of increasing the coherence of EC legislation in the areas 
of consumer and contract law, although they appear to conclude that the Draft Common 
Frame of Reference (DCFR) and the Acquis Principles (ACQP) fall signifi cantly short of 
achieving those goals. The stated purpose of the Italian comments is to stimulate critical 
yet constructive commentaries – at least insofar as the authors’ intention is concerned – 
to be submitted to the project’s architects, with a view to contribute to the harmonization 
of European contract and consumer law. General criticisms concern the scope of appli-
cation of the two instruments, DCFR and ACQP (often extended without good reasons 
to B2B contracts) and the ‘legislative technique’ used in drafting them. Further causes 
for concern from the point of view of Italian scholars relate to general principles such as 
good faith, unfairness, reasonableness, or the principle of non-discrimination. As for the 
specifi c contents of the DCFR and ACQP, Italian scholars analyse formal requirements, 
contract formation, non-negotiated terms, withdrawal, performance of obligations, non-
performance and damages.
Résumé: La doctrine italienne approuve le développement d’une européanisation du 
droit privé, à travers le processus de renforcement de la cohérence de la législation de 
l’UE dans les domaines du droit de la consommation et du droit des contrats. Elle conclue 
cependant que le Projet de Cadre Commun de Référence (PCCR) et l’Acquis Communau-
taire (ACQP) échouent en grande partie dans la poursuite de ces objectifs. Le but énoncé 
des commentaires italiens est de stimuler des avis critiques mais constructifs – du moins 
s’agissant de l’intention des auteurs – et de les soumettre aux architectes du projet, afi n 
de contribuer à l’harmonisation du droit européen des contrats et de la consommation. 
Les critiques générales visent le champ d’application des deux instruments, le PCCR et 
l’ACQP (souvent étendus, sans bonnes raisons, aux contrats B2B) et la « technique lég-
islative » utilisée pour les concevoir. D’autres causes de préoccupation énoncées par les 
spécialistes italiens concernent des principes généraux tels que la bonne foi, la déloy-
auté, l’équité ou le principe de non-discrimination. Quant aux contenus spécifi ques du 
PCCR et de l’ACQP, les spécialistes italiens font une analyse des conditions de forme, de 
la formation des contrats, des termes non-négociés, de la rétractation, de l’exécution des 
obligations, de l’inexécution et des dommages.
Zusammenfassung: Italienische Kommentatoren begrüßen die Förderung der 
Europäisierung des Privatrechts durch die Erhöhung der Kohärenz der EU Gesetzgebung 
auf dem Gebiet des Verbraucherrechts und Vertragsrechts, obwohl sie festgestellt haben, 
dass der Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR) und die Acquis Principles (ACQP) 
dieses Ziel nicht erreichen können. Das vorgegebene Ziel der italienischen Kommentare 
ist, die kritische, aber auch konstruktive Kommentierung (zumindest aus der Sicht des 
Autors), die den Architekten dieser Projekte vorgelegt werden sollte, zu fördern. Hier-
durch soll gleichzeitig auch zur Harmonisierung des europäischen Vertragsrechts und Ver-
braucherrechts beigetragen werden. Die allgemeine Kritik betrifft den  Anwendungsbereich 
* Dr Barbara Pasa teaches Comparative Law at the Faculty of Law, University of Turin.
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dieser beiden Instrumente, also den DCFR und den ACQP, die ohne nähere Begründ-
ung teilweise auch auf Business to Business (B2B)-Verträge anwendbar sind, sowie die 
Gesetzgebungstechnik, die zum Erlass der beiden Instrumente geführt hat. Die weiteren 
Bedenken des italienischen Wissenschaftlers betreffen die allgemeinen Grundsätze, wie 
Treu und Glauben, die Unbilligkeit, die Angemessenheit sowie auch den Grundsatz der 
Nichtdiskriminierung. In Bezug auf die spezifi schen Inhalte der DCFR und der ACQP 
werden die Formvorschriften, der Vertragsschluss, die unabdingbaren Bestimmungen, 
der Rücktritt, die Erfüllung eines Schuldverhältnisses, die Nichterfüllung sowie auch die 
Schadensersatzregelungen durch die italienischen Wissenschaftler näher analysiert.
Keywords: DCFR, ACQP, Italian doctrine, Consumer protection, European contract law.
1. The European Context
The limited access for European jurists to studies and researches carried out by Ital-
ian legal scholars, evidently as a result of the language barrier, is the reason for pro-
ducing this summary, in the context of the national debate taking place following 
the publication of the Acquis Principles (ACQP) and the Draft Common Frame of 
Reference (DCFR).
The Italian debate on this topic is of recent origin and seems to be less lively 
when compared, for example, to the ones taking place in other European legal sys-
tems. In Britain, for instance, the House of Lords itself has been debating EU mea-
sures and documents, in order to influence the Government’s position in negotia-
tions at EU level.1 In Germany, for instance, legal scholars are at the forefront in 
drafting the DCFR and have encouraged the founding of a new École de l’Exégèse 
on the subject, which they largely illustrate in University lecture halls and major 
law reviews. Even French jurists, who regard the Code civil as the personification of 
their legal spirit, and notwithstanding the degree of suspicion which characterizes 
their approach to European and comparative legal scholarship, recognize the impact 
of the DCFR.2 This comes as no surprise at all, given that both primary and second-
ary Community law, which is restated in the DCFR and better in the ACQP, often has 
1 House of Lords Report, European Union Committee, 12th Report of Session 2008–2009, European 
Contract Law: The Draft Common Frame of Reference, published 10 Jun. 2009, HL Paper 95.
2 On the functionalist view of the market, summed up in the ‘ordoliberal formula: highly competi-
tive social market economy’, inserted into the Lisbon Treaty 2007, as well as on the active involve-
ment of French jurists, see recently A. Somma, ‘Verso il diritto privato europeo? Il Quadro Comune 
di Riferimento nel conflitto tra diritto comunitario e diritti nazionali’, Rivista trimestrale di diritto 
e procedura civile, fasc. 4 (2008), at 1097–1132. In France they propose alternative models to the 
‘ordoliberal Community model’ Cf. Association H. Capitant et Société de Législation Comparée, 
Projet de Cadre Commun de Référence. Terminologie contractuelle commune, coll. Droit privé com-
paré et européen dirigée par B. Fauvarque-Cosson, vol. 6, SLC Paris (2008); Association H. Capitant 
et Société de législation comparée, Projet de Cadre Commun de Référence. Principes contractuels 
communs, coll. Droit privé comparé et européen dirigée par B. Fauvarque-Cosson, vol. 7, SLC Paris 
(2008); in English: B. Fauvarque-Cosson & D. Mazeaud (eds), European Contract Law-Materials for 
a CFR: Terminology, Guiding Principles, Model Rules (Munich: Sellier, 2008).
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a strong impact on national civil laws and today embodies the prerequisites which 
inspire the reform of many Civil codes.3 The reforms referred to here are the already 
enacted Schuldrechtsmodernisierungsgesetz, of November 2001,4 the Avant-projet de 
réforme du droit des obligations et de la prescription, of September 2005,5 still an 
ongoing project, and the new Propuesta de Anteproyecto de Ley de Modernización 
del Derecho de Obligaciones y Contratos of January 2009,6 as well as other reforms 
in Central and Eastern European Countries, such as the re-codification of Czech pri-
vate law and of Estonian Law of Obligations, and so forth.7
2. A Summary of the Italian Debate
To date, the Italian studies dedicated to an accurate analysis of the DCFR and the 
ACQP (whereby the former is coordinated and sometimes constitutes a mere transposi-
tion thereof, not always using a particularly convincing methodology),8 are contained 
in two volumes of collected papers presented at the Pisa and Ferrara Conferences, one 
taking place in 20079 and the other in 2008.10 These Conferences were preceded by a 
meeting at the University of Rome III in February 2007, organized by the association 
Magistratura Democratica (an important liberal Italian association of judges and pros-
ecutors), who arranged a subsequent meeting in Florence, in March 2007, together 
with its European counterpart MEDEL (Magistrats européens pour la démocratie et les 
libertés). The meetings sought to exploit the rise of a new cultural ferment, involving 
the active participation of the whole legal community and the magistrati (‘magistrate’ 
is a generic term in Italian, comprising both prosecutors and judges) in particular.11
3 Cf. A. Gambaro, ‘La riforma del diritto italiano delle obbligazioni e dei contratti nella prospettiva del 
diritto europeo’, Rivista di diritto civile (2006), I, at 27–32.
4 Gesetz zur Modernisierung des Schuldrechts, 26 Nov. 2001 (BGBl. 2001 I,3138).
5 Under the direction of prof. Pierre Catala, available on the website at the address <www.lexisnexis.
fr/pdf/DO/RAPPORTCATALA.pdf>.
6 Available on the website of the Spanish Ministry of Justice at <www.mjusticia.es>.
7 See respectively L. Tichý, ‘Processes of Modernisation of Private Law Compared, and the CFR’s 
Influence’, Juridica International II (2008) (online): 35–42; A. Värv, ‘The Draft Common Frame of 
Reference’s Regulation of Unjustified Enrichment: Some Observations from Estonia’s Viewpoint’, 
Juridica International II (2008) (online): 63–75.
8 On the autonomy of the ACQP with respect to the other components of the DCFR, in particular 
with respect to the contribution made by the Study Group for a European Civil Code, cf. G. Ajani, 
S. Ferreri & M. Graziadei, ‘Introduzione ai principi di diritto comunitario in materia di contratto’, 
Rivista trimestrale di diritto e procedura civile, fasc. 1 (2009), at 271–278; previously, see passim B. 
Pasa, La forma informativa nel diritto contrattuale europeo. Verso una nozione procedurale di con-
tratto (Napoli: Jovene, 2008), at 333 et seq.
9 Cf. E. Navarretta (ed.), Il diritto europeo dei contratti fra parte generale e norme di settore. Atti del 
Convegno (Pisa, 25–26 May 2007) (Milano: Giuffrè, 2008).
10 Cf. G. De Cristofaro (ed.), I ‘principi’ del diritto comunitario dei contratti. Acquis communautaire e 
diritto privato europeo (Torino: Giappichelli, 2009).
11 Cf. G. Bisogmi, ‘Un diritto civile per l’Europa’, Questione giustizia, n. 3 (2007), at 600–615, at 608. See 
also <http://magistraturademocratica.it/node/419>, with the reply by MEDEL (16 May 2007) to the 
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The stated purpose of the Italian writings is to stimulate critical yet construc-
tive commentary – at least insofar as the authors’ intention is concerned – to be sub-
mitted to the projects’ architects, with a view to contribute to the harmonization of 
European contract and consumer law.
In point of fact, the commentaries criticizing the DCFR and, before, the 
ACQP outnumber the favourable ones. There is no evidence of the development of a 
general law of contracts common to the legal systems of Europe.12
In general terms, these commentaries outline that while the acquis commu-
nautaire is the product of the harmonization process of European private law in the 
consumer protection sector and imposes a protection model which serves to con-
struct the internal market by means of mandatory rules (i.e., Community law), the 
DCFR and the ACQP are an academic exercise of consolidation of what is already in 
force in European Community law, whether good or bad, taking no or little account 
of a perspective of the law as it ought to be (i.e., a sort of Restatement).
As favourable commentaries, we can recall the revision of the existing acquis 
and the systematic organization of notions, principles and model rules, which con-
form to European contract law, both in the ACQP and in the DCFR, which has been 
granted the approval of many authors.13 They outline, in general terms, the ‘unify-
ing rationalization’ and the ‘re-ordering of the Babel of legal languages’ achieved 
by the DCFR, which constitutes a prelude to a Europe founded on a common legal 
culture. This community of shared culture will create the basis for the development 
of future national and community legislative measures. However, there are authors 
who advocate a different course of action, namely promoting the development 
of Standard Terms and Conditions (STC) for EU-wide use by private parties,14 a 
Green Paper of 8 Feb. 2007 on the revision of the Acquis related to consumers (GUUE 15 Mar. 2007, 
C 61/5).
12 Cf. C. Castronovo, ‘Quadro Comune di Riferimento e acquis comunitario: conciliazione o incompat-
ibilità?’, Europa e diritto privato (2007), at 275–290: the author poses the question of what instru-
mental function the CFR was meant to perform in relation to the acquis communautaire; the latter, 
in fact, according to the Commission’s well-known Action Plan 2003 [COM (2003) 68 final], had to 
be improved as regards its consistency and quality by means of a ‘tool-box’; the question then is if it 
should only reorganize what already existed rather than proceed to the construction of a new body of 
European law (at 288). For a less traumatic, rather more favourable view, cf. M. Meli, ‘Armonizzazi-
one del diritto europeo e Quadro Comune di Riferimento’, Europa e diritto privato, fasc. 1 (2008), 
at 59–81.
13 G. Alpa & G. Conte, ‘Riflessioni sul progetto di Common Frame of Reference e sulla revisione 
dell’Acquis communautaire’, Rivista di diritto civile, fasc. 2, I (2008), 141–178, at 165. Cf. also V. 
Scalisi, ‘Alberto Trabucchi e la costruzione in Europa di un diritto privato comune’, Europa e diritto 
privato, fasc. 4 (2008), 907–928, at 916.
14 Cf. F. Cafaggi, ‘La regolazione privata nel diritto europeo dei contratti’, Contratto e impresa. 
Europa, fasc. 1 (2008), at 104–169: he speculates as to how far business can be pushed regarding 
standardization, without infringing the competition laws.
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trajectory already signalled by the Commission as one of the possible options,15 as 
opposed to rule-based legislation. This would entail the  encouragement of private 
self-regulation based on common standards and the  harmonization of contract law 
using ‘soft’ measures, obviously without exceeding the limits imposed by competi-
tion law (Articles 81 and 82 EC Treaty). The debating stance of Italian legal schol-
ars may therefore be summarized as taking a dialogical, multilevel perspective: 
they advocate a simultaneous recourse to common standard terms and  general 
principles, maintaining typically national specific rules. Such discourse strategies 
are aimed at mitigating the fears of scholars and, above all, practitioners who see 
in the DCFR the preliminary step towards a full-scale codification of European 
civil law.
Italian legal scholars assume that what we are witnessing with respect to the 
DCFR is a ‘cultural exercise’, which responds to the need of finding a shared lan-
guage within the common European arena while addressing concrete demands for 
the protection of citizens’ civil rights. In this manner, the so-called ‘political CFR’, 
which is expected to follow this preliminary ‘academic CFR’ (or DCFR), could con-
stitute an essential instrument for the achievement of a ‘constitutional Europe’, as 
it represents a means for securing one of the cornerstones of citizens’ rights and an 
affirmation of one of the founding reasons underpinning the EU, namely the cre-
ation of a real and efficient common space for civil justice in Europe.
The DCFR has only recently been encompassed by the Directorate General 
for Justice, Freedom and Security, which has taken over responsibility for the DCFR 
from the Directorate General for Health and Consumers. The transfer of respon-
sibility appears to reflect a new policy view that the CFR will be addressed in the 
broader context of EU action in the area of civil justice. A new start, which culmi-
nated in the so-called ‘Stockholm Programme’, a multi-annual programme (period 
2010–2014) adopted by the Heads of State and Government of Member States at the 
European Council in Stockholm, at the end of December 2009.16
As long as the ‘final’ CFR remains tied to a systematic framework of laws, it 
will never become the common point of reference for contract law and even less so 
for European civil law. It could possibly constitute the more general part of a Euro-
pean Civil Code, but it will still lack any prior political debate explaining the reasons 
15 This was ‘Measure II’ in the Action Plan. Cf. European Contract Law and the Revision of the Acquis: 
The Way Forward, COM (2004) 651 final, at 6 et seq.
16 Cf. Brussels, 2 Dec. 2009, Document CO EUR-PREP 3, JAI 896, POLGEN 229, from the Presidency 
to the European Council, for its approval in accordance with Art. 68 TFUE and publication in the 
Official Journal of the European Union. At its meeting of 30 Nov. 2009 and 1 Dec. 2009, the Council 
(Justice and Home Affairs), held a wide-ranging exchange of views on the Programme, which was 
met with a broad consensus. Cf. Brussels, 11 Dec. 2009 EUCO 6109, Conclusion.
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for its adoption.17 In this regard, the issue regarding the legitimacy of a body of civil 
or contract law and its political basis still has to be clarified.18
3. Some Critical Commentaries to the DCFR and the ACQP
Of the two volumes of collected papers presented at the Pisa and Ferrara Confer-
ences, the second one comprehensively analyses the chapters of the ACQP,19 com-
paring them to the Interim Outline Edition of the DCFR.20
From the numerous commentaries made by the Italian authors, with no pre-
tensions to present an exhaustive coverage, the following may be noted.
3.1 B2C Contracts versus B2B Contracts
The first criticism concerns the general framework of the DCFR and ACQP, which 
should have operated a clearer distinction between B2C and B2B contracts, in a 
manner consistent with the different interests and values underlying the two types 
of legal relations. Further, the DCFR and ACQP should have integrated the current 
competition rules (e.g., Articles 81 and 82 EC Treaty), taking into account the role 
of private enforcement of competition law.21
B2B contracts are a sector that does not benefit from any assimilation to 
other disciplinary regimes, such as B2C contracts, nor a sector that feels the need 
of a European legislative action specifically addressing peculiar issues. Taking into 
17 Cf. Bisogni, at 614.
18 Scalisi, supra n. 13, at 923, Alpa & Conte, supra n. 13, at 175.
19 In the version published by the Research Group on the Existing EC Private Law (Acquis Group), Prin-
ciples of Existing EC Contract Law (Acquis Principles). Contract I. Pre-contractual Obligations, Conclu-
sion of Contract, Unfair Terms (Munich: Sellier, 2007). The numerous commentaries made by the  Italian 
authors refer to this first volume, which from now on will be cited as Acquis Principles 2007, supra. 
At the end of 2009, the Research Group on the Existing EC Private Law (Acquis Group) 
published the second volume, a full version of ACQPs, together with comments: Principles of the 
Existing EC Contract Law (Acquis Principles). Contract II. General Provisions, Delivery of Goods, 
Package Travel and Payment Services (Munich: Sellier, 2009). This second volume includes a 
revision of ‘Contract I’ rules within an innovative structure and presents numerous new rules, on 
 remedies for non-performance and on certain specific contracts, such as delivery of goods, package 
travel and payment services, which were previously available on the website of the Acquis group. 
Cf. H. Schulte-Nölke & F. Zoll, Introductory Part, xxiii–xxxv, in Principles of the Existing EC 
 Contract Law (Acquis Principles). Contract II 2009, supra.
20 In the version prepared by the Study Group on European Civil Code and the Research Group on EC 
Private Law (Acquis Group), ed. Christian von Bar, Eric Clive, Hans Schulte-Nölke, Hugh Beale, 
Johnny Herre, Jérôme Huet, Peter Schlechtriem, Matthias Storme, Stephen Swann, Paul Varul, 
Anna Veneziano & Fryderyk Zoll, Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private 
Law, Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR), Interim Outline Edition (Munich: Sellier, 2008) 
(2nd edn, 2009).
21 L. Di Nella, ‘Il Consumatore, il professionista e l’inderogabilità in pejus’, in ed. De Cristofaro, 
supra n. 10, 23–94, at 38.
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account the pre-existing Unidroit Principles,22 this is – indeed – superfluous. Those 
Unidroit principles have already formed the basis for the development of interna-
tional common standards and rules regarding commercial transactions and for new 
codes as well, for example, those of the Russian Federation, Estonia and Lithuania, 
as well as the reform of the Spanish Commercial Code and the BGB, and the 1999 
Chinese law on contracts.
Moreover, the judgments of the courts of the Member States prefer to invoke 
the Unidroit Principles as soft law23 whether with a view to integrating international 
instruments of uniform law (such as the CISG) or to applying the national law of the 
State, or to demonstrate conformity to the most widely-regarded standards at inter-
national level.
3.2 Good Faith and Reasonableness
A second question of general importance relates to the ‘legislative’ technique 
used in drafting the DCFR and the ACQP, which, albeit constituting an ‘academic 
 exercise’,24 are in fact structured as if they were a legal text based on general clauses 
and undefined legal concepts. In particular, the ACQP, while devoid of legal force, 
have been distilled from laws and rules in force in Community law (and consequently 
in the Member States of the Community), which is enough to classify the drafting 
technique adopted by the Acquis Group as legislative. Having drawn attention to the 
similarities to the work of the American Law Institute and the US Restatement of 
the Law, the Italian author of this comment25 summarizes the frequent recourse to 
general clauses, in particular those of ‘good faith’ and ‘reasonableness’.
Given the policy choice made, of law favouring vague and undefined concepts, 
which reserve a margin of discretion for Member States in approximating to Com-
munity measures, this is a quite widespread trend in Community law. The Italian 
scholar speculates as to whether the use of general clauses is better able to achieve 
harmonization of European contract law or whether it is not instead the outcome of 
‘damaging compromises’,26 opting for the second hypothesis.
22 Cf. M.J. Bonell, ‘Il diritto europeo dei contratti e gli sviluppi del diritto contrattuale a livello inter-
nazionale’, Europa e diritto privato (2007), 599–638, at 624 et seq., and 635 et seq. This author, on 
the other hand, is attracted by Schulte-Nölke’s idea of an optional European consumer contracts law, 
which consumers could select by pressing the ‘blue button’ with the gold stars which represents the 
Member States, therefore excluding enterprises, from the small to medium and big ones: the lex mer-
catoria is single, nothing is gained by breaking it up into ‘European’ and ‘International’ (at 620).
23 See database UNILEX <www.unilex.info>.
24 G. Ajani & H. Schulte-Nölke, The Principles of the Existing EC Contract Law: A Preliminary Output 
of the Acquis Group, in Acquis Principles 2007, supra n. 19, at IX.
25 S. Troiano, ‘Clausole generali e nozioni giuridiche indeterminate nei principi Acquis del diritto 
comunitario dei contratti’, in ed. De Cristofaro, supra n. 10, at 190–240: the author lists all the 
ACQP in which these general clauses appear, at 194.
26 Troiano, supra n. 25, at 224.
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The first general clause analysed concerns ‘unfairness’, which underpins the 
monitoring of the contents of B2B contracts.
Under Article 6:301 (2) ACQP,27 ‘A term in a contract between businesses 
which has not been individually negotiated is considered unfair only if using that 
term amounts to a gross deviation from good commercial practice.’ Under Article 
II-9:406 DCFR, ‘A term in a contract between businesses is unfair (…) only if it is a 
term forming part of standard terms supplied by one party and of such a nature that 
its use grossly deviates from good commercial practice, contrary to good faith and 
fair dealing.’
According to the Italian author’s commentary, on the one hand, it is arbitrary 
to extend this principle’s scope of application to all B2B contracts, and in any case to 
all contracts made by enterprises. It would have been better to limit its application to 
certain categories of B2B (essentially in the financial services sector); on the other 
hand, it is arbitrary to have limited its applicability to just those clauses which are 
‘not individually negotiated’. In addition, the commentator underlines the lack of 
definition of the principle, due to the use of two (or more, in the case of the DCFR) 
vague concepts such as ‘gross deviation’, ‘good commercial practices’, ‘good faith’ 
and ‘fair dealing’.
Other issues concern the criterion of ‘reasonableness’, which appears from 
Article II-1:104 DCFR, in relation to ‘usages and practices’; it is actually in the 
DCFR which appears as many as 500 times.28 Here, criticism is directed at the 
idea that such a criterion is capable of bridging the gap between the legal tradi-
tions of Common Law and Civil law, as a functional step aimed at reorganizing 
the conceptual framework of European law, in terms of less dogmatism and more 
concreteness and pragmatism. Nonetheless, according to this commentator, the 
concept of ‘reasonableness’ is unknown in many legal traditions and hence, in the 
countries of the community, it does not have a sufficiently consolidated body of 
precedents upon which to draw in order to identify recurrent behaviour, so that 
the term can acquire concrete significance. Furthermore, in reorganizing the con-
ceptual framework, the risk arises that the specific meanings of various concepts 
(such as diligence, good faith and equity: in Italian, diligenza, buona fede, equità) 
are lost within an ill-defined, catch-all notion, which – in reality – operates within 
the bounds of the general principle of ‘good faith’.29 The final criticism is that 
in this way, the predictable application of the rules and certainty in the law are 
prejudiced.30
27 Cf. Acquis Principles 2007, supra n. 19, authors of the Comments: T. Pfeiffer & M. Ebers, at 234 
et seq. Wording slightly changed in the second volume, but not the substance of the provision.
28 Troiano, supra n. 25, at 201.
29 See Acquis Principles 2007, supra n. 19, Comment No. 7 of Art. 2:102 ACQP by Pfeiffer & Ebers, 
supra n. 27, at 70.
30 Troiano, supra n. 25, at 202.
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From another perspective, the Italian commentator observes ruefully, in per-
haps a rather contradictory way, the over-prudent use of the canon of good faith, 
which could be elevated to become a guiding principle placed at the top of the ACQP, 
as the lowest common denominator for all the European legal systems, including the 
Common law,31 concerning the negotiation stage until performance.32 Conversely, 
the choice was made to invoke the principle of good faith in a range of rules scat-
tered over a number of different contexts: pre-contractual dealings33 (Articles 2:101–
2:103 ACQP), performance of obligations34 (Articles 7:101–7:102 ACQP), unfair 
(non-negotiated) terms (Article 6:301 ACQP). The fragmentation of the canon of 
good faith also emerges from the importance accorded to legitimate expectations 
(Articles 2:102 and 7:101(2) ACQP). However, in this case the literal tenor of the 
provisions makes it unclear whether this canon can effectively give rise to duties that 
are accessory to the main obligation, but, if this was the case, it would constitute a 
more restrictive rule than the principle of good faith in executivis would otherwise 
suggest.35
The Italian commentator above all criticizes Article 7:103 ACQP on the 
duty of ‘loyalty’ imposed on the debtor,36 which has been extended to include cases 
going beyond those for which it was originally designed. In fact, according to Direc-
tive MiFID No. 2004/39, it was intended to apply to certain long-term contractual 
relationships. The criticism does not so much concern the fragile toe-hold support-
ing the duty of loyalty, which substantially derives from good faith, but mainly the 
misunderstanding about what is provided for under Article 19(1) MiFID: ‘Member 
States shall require that, when providing investment services and/or, where appro-
priate, ancillary services to clients, an investment firm act honestly, fairly and pro-
fessionally in accordance with the best interests of its clients (…).’ The investment 
31 Although legal scholars do not concur on the point. Cf. Troiano, supra n. 25, at 218. Contra: 
F. Zoll, ‘Die Grundregeln der Acquis-Gruppe im Spannungsverhältnis zwischen acquis commun 
und acquis communautaire’, GPR (Gemeinschaftsprivatrecht), 2008, at 114.
32 The option was also debated within the Acquis Group: see Comment No. 8 of Art. 2:101 ACQP, by 
Pfeiffer & Ebers, supra n. 27, at 65: ‘Given the fact that the requirement of good faith in Commu-
nity law is not limited to pre-contractual dealings, an alternative option could have been to include a 
general rule on good faith equivalent to Art. I-1:102 DCFR(...).’
33 According to Troiano, supra n. 25, at 221, too broad a role was given to pre-contractual negotiations; 
thus he makes precisely the same criticisms as those already made by N. Jansen & R. Zimmermann, 
‘Grundregeln des bestehenden Gemeinschaftsprivatrechts?’ JZ (Juristenzeitung), 2007, 1113–1126, 
at 1123, of which there is a subsequent version in English: ‘Restating the Acquis Communautaire? 
A Critical Examination of the ‘Principles of the Existing EC Contract Law’, 71 Modern Law Review 
(2008): 505–534.
34 To which, on the other hand, according to Troiano, a narrow role has been given: cf. Troiano, supra 
n. 25, at 222.
35 Troiano, supra n. 25, at 216.
36 Cf. Acquis Principles 2007, supra n. 19, authors of the Comments: C. Aubert de Vincelles, 
P.  Machnikowski, J. Pisulinski, J. Rochfeld, M. Szpunar & F. Zoll, at 266 et seq.
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firm must conform to standards of professional diligence, in order to protect the 
best interests of its clients already covered by the contractual scheme and not pro-
tect  further interests through an extensive interpretation of the contract.
To conclude, the Italian legal scholar cited does not believe that it is possible 
to abandon general clauses which provide fundamental elements of flexibility. How-
ever, their use must be calibrated by means of the redefinition and reinforcement of 
the ECJ’s interpretative role, so that it can give the general clauses concrete mean-
ing. As things stand at present, there is no unanimity of agreement as to the possibil-
ity for the ECJ to give concrete interpretation of undefined concepts in conformity 
with national legal traditions. On the basis of the subsidiarity principle (Article 5(2) 
EC Treaty), there is a presumption that where the ECJ can only draw up hermeneu-
tic guidelines, framing the methodology of interpretation, Member States give con-
crete form to the general clauses, since the Community legal system does not have 
a sufficiently consolidated set of values, principles and rules available to draw on in 
order to give concrete meaning to the undefined concepts. The ECJ itself 37 refuses 
to pronounce upon the application of general criteria in a particular clause, in that 
the evaluation of ‘unfairness’ is the task of the national courts, after having ascer-
tained the factual circumstances and following the rules of the national legal system 
within which the clause is to produce its effects.
It may be possible to overcome this latter aspect, in that the actual and con-
crete evaluation of a clause does not necessarily have to be based on pre-existing 
legal material (namely: Member States’ national laws in force) but may be deduced 
from ‘law in action’, as interpreted by the case law of the ECJ and as applied in the 
Member States.
3.3 Notions of Consumers and Business
Further causes for concern from Italian scholars’ standpoint relate to the notions 
of consumer and business. In particular, the fundamental notions of consumer and 
business which appear in the ACQP (Articles 1:201–1:202 ACQP)38 are not very 
convincing.39
So far as the notion of consumer is concerned, according to the Italian com-
mentator express account should have also been taken of those who are negotiat-
ing with the aim of setting up a business, a situation which is not yet provided for, 
however. This preparatory activity is nonetheless considered as ‘business activity’, 
37 ECJ 1 Apr. 2004, C-237/02, Freiburger Kommunalbauten GmbH Baugesellschaft & Co. KG v. 
Ludger Hofstetter and Ulrike Hofstetter (also confirmed in ECJ 26 Oct. 2006, C-168/05, Elisa Maria 
Mostaza Claro v. Centro Móvil Milenium SL).
38 Cf. Acquis Principles 2007, supra n. 19, author of the Comments: M. Ebers, at 23 et seq.
39 Di Nella, supra n. 21, at 64.
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and those engaging in it are included under the general definition of business.40 
Then, the notion of consumer should have taken legal persons into account as well 
(with or without legal personality), who do not carry on any business activity in an 
 organized or stable way, but for non-profit purposes. However, it is true that the ECJ 
has already ruled on the point, limiting the notion to natural persons only.41
So far as concerns business, the commentary criticizes the fact that the notion 
seems to concentrate on ‘self-employed persons or entrepreneurs’. With this remark, 
the Italian commentator assumes that agents are excluded (to which, however, 
reference is made in the ACQP42), as well as autonomous workers and craftsmen 
(whereas, once again, these categories are present in the ACQP43); beside these, the 
Italian commentator assumes that producers of goods and services are excluded, but 
also in this case the comment does not seem well-founded, since business is defined 
regardless of its ‘legal form’ or ‘ownership’.
3.4 Formal Requirements
Careful analyses have also been made of the provisions regarding form, contained 
in Articles 1:301–1:302 ACQP44 and Articles 1:303–1:307 ACQP,45 as well as those 
which have respectively been subsumed, with some amendments, into the DCFR, 
Articles I-1:105–1:106 and Article II-1:107.
Italian commentary46 is overall quite favourable and accept the principle of 
‘legislative indifference’ between in writing and textual form in a durable medium, 
provided this is reasonably accessible to the recipient (e.g., Article 2:206(3) 
40 See Ebers, supra n. 38, Comment No. 15, at 27: ‘Transactions in the course of setting up a profes-
sional activity are clearly directed at business activity.’
41 ECJ 22 Nov. 2001, Joined Cases Idealservice, C-541/99 and C-542/99.
42 See Ebers, supra n. 38, Comment No. 3 to Art. 1:202 ACQP: ‘Conduct by a third party who is acting 
in the name or on behalf of a business is attributed to the business. A business therefore does not 
lose this quality by using a consumer as its agent or other representative’ (at 33).
43 At 34, Example 1, where the question as to whether a person qualifies as business does not depend 
on business experience, but rather on the purpose of the transaction. Transactions in the course of 
setting up a professional activity are clearly directed at business activity. Furthermore it is not nec-
essary that the business intends to make profit in the course of its activity. See Ebers, supra n. 38, 
Comment No. 15 to Art. 1:201 ACQP (at 27).
44 Cf. Acquis Principles 2007, supra n. 19, authors of the Comments: S. Leible, J. Pisulinski & F. Zoll, 
at 38 et seq. In the second volume, Contract II, supra n. 19, a new provision has been inserted, Art. 
1:302 (Effectiveness of notice), thus the entire s. 3 of Ch. 1(Notice and Form) has been renumbered. 
Here we follow the previous numeration.
45 Cf. Acquis Principles 2007, supra n. 19, authors of the Comments: E. Arroyo i Amayuelas, B. Pasa & 
A. Vaquer Aloy, at 41 et seq.
46 S. Pagliantini, ‘La forma nei principi del diritto comunitario’, in ed. De Cristofaro, supra n. 10, 
at 95–160.
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ACQP47). These formal requirements contemplated as valuable legal items for ‘mon-
itoring through documentation’ all the potentially useful information for the end-
user, are a form of protection (so-called warning function of the form). They aim at 
long-term conservation of the information (so-called informative form). It is not a 
new solemn formalism, a new dogmatic category, and it does not exclude the tradi-
tional functions of the written form (which have to do with the validity of contract).
The Italian commentator then highlights the fact that the key notion Textual 
form was taken from the German Textform (§ 126b BGB).48 The notion is referred 
to in Article 1:304 ACQP, and it is reproduced for information, documentation 
and monitoring purposes in the DCFR (see, for example, a notice in textual form 
on a durable medium for the formal confirmation of a contract between businesses, 
Article II-4:210 DCFR, or the ‘Del credere clause’, which is valid only if and to the 
extent that the agreement is in a textual form on a durable medium, Article IV-E-
3:313 DCFR). As in the German legal system Textform represents an exception to 
the general principle of Formfreiheit49 and is at a subordinate level with respect to 
legal written form (§ 126 Schriftform), electronic form (§ 126a, Elektronische Form) 
and notarial form (notarielle Beurkundung) but is at a higher level than oral form 
(mündlichen Erklärung), in the structure outlined by the ACQP (and transposed 
in the DCFR) it performs the same ‘exceptional’ function and is set at the same 
level.50
As far as the signature issue, the system outlined by the ACQP and the DCFR 
seems to be tending more and more towards the use of surrogate signatures; and in 
fact Article 1:307 ACQP and Article I-1:106(2) DCFR confine themselves to approv-
ing the definition of ‘signature’ but does not call for the signature to be written by 
hand, an essential requirement of a contractual declaration, according to traditional 
legal literature.
What seems to be increasingly the case, in the national legal systems51 too, is 
that whenever instruments which are alternatives to written signatures are declared 
47 Renumbered as Art. 2:204 ACQP in the second volume of the Acquis principles of 2009, 
supra n. 19.
48 In the ACQP and the DCFR the third requisite, which is present in the German notion of Textform 
(the ‘sign’ or ‘mark’ aimed at ascribing a declaration to a certain party) is lacking, but it is clear – 
also from the literal tenor of the BGB – that this requisite does not mean any ‘written signature’. 
Therefore the issue does not – in the least – concern the written signature as a ‘precondition for the 
validity of the declaration’. Cf. Pagliantini, supra n. 46, at 97.
49 In any case it seems to be a principle in name rather than in practice: on this point see Pasa, supra 
n. 8, at 47 et seq., at 129 et seq., and the legal doctrine cited in her volume.
50 On a different presentation of the ‘levels of formal requirements’ see Pasa, supra n. 8, at 347 et seq.
51 See, for example, the Italian system, at least so far as concerns B2C contracts, where hand-made 
signatures are downgraded to an incidental element, as national legal scholars have noted: R. Sacco, 
‘La forma’, in Il contratto, eds R. Sacco & G. De Nova, vol. I, of the Trattato di diritto civile, by 
239
to be acceptable, in the negotiation contexts referred to, they conform to socially 
recognized and trusted practice.
The Italian commentator is also in favour of the requirement of ‘unilateral 
non-alterability’ included in the definition of durable medium (Article 1:305 ACQP; 
Article I-1:105 DCFR) on the basis of which – as in German case law – the definition 
as a durable medium for the website managed by the business professional is refused. 
It will only be treated as a durable medium if the ‘save page’ function is active, in a 
way that the data can be saved, downloaded and printed, namely it is easily accessible 
by the recipient, whether a consumer or business. However, there is a complicating 
factor in the definition framework of the ACQP and the DCFR: the fact that there is 
no relationship of ‘one-to-one correspondence’ between ‘textual form’ and ‘durable 
medium’, given that not every form of information reproduced with that durable sup-
port can be said to be issued in textual form. Audio recordings and films on DVD are 
not within the definition (unlike an e-mail, for example) and therefore come under 
‘non-written means’, which in any case seem to remain suitable for modifying a pre-
existing item expressed in textual form.
Article 2:203(1) ACQP and Article II-3:103(1) DCFR on information duties 
towards disadvantaged consumers prescribe that the information must be ‘clear’, 
but not written: orality52 is, therefore, relevant for the purposes of fulfilling the 
informational duty, and the necessity for a written ‘confirmation’ (or in a textual 
form), whenever general contractual conditions are involved, is the unifying crite-
rion ( Article 2:205(1) ACQP53 and Article II-3:105(2) DCFR).
Even though no contract has been concluded, the breach of the information 
duties entitles the other party to reliance damages: ‘failure to observe a particu-
lar form will have the same consequences as breach of information duties’ (Article 
2:206(4) ACQP and Article 2:207(2) ACQP;54 Article II-3:106(4) DCFR).
The crucial importance of the formal requirements concerns this fact, that nei-
ther the ACQP nor the DCFR explicitly set out the remedies, apart from noting that 
the failure to observe a particular form will have the same consequences as breach of 
information duties. This is a direct consequence of the acquis  communautaire, which 
R. Sacco, 3rd edn (Torino: Giappichelli, 2004), 703–776, at 730; thus Pagliantini, supra n. 46, at 
145; Pasa, supra n. 8, at 373 et seq.
52 Under Art. 1:301 ACQP and Art. II-1:106 DCFR ‘notice may be given by any means appropriate 
to the circumstances’ which applies to all possible notices, including offer and acceptance, pre-
 contractual information, notice of withdrawal and termination, etc.
The form, therefore, is merely instrumental to the knowledge and a communication, which 
has in any case achieved the purpose of making the intention known (of offer, acceptance, release 
from contractual obligation, etc.), will be effective. This rests on the principle that communication 
must always conform to the canons of good faith and transparency.
53 Renumbered as Art. 4:105 ACQP in the second volume of the Acquis Principles 2009, supra n. 19.
54 Renumbered respectively as Arts 2:204 and 2:208 ACQP (the latter with major reformulation) in the 
second volume of the Acquis Principles 2009, supra n. 19.
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does not set down a general rule with regard to the remedies applicable in case of 
breach of formal requirements; given the variety of contexts in which the principle 
of form and its exceptions appear within the acquis, the question is to be resolved 
taking into consideration the specific function and purpose of each particular for-
mal requirement.55 As far as the consequences for breach of  information duties is 
concerned, they can be different for damages because of the causation requirement 
(incorrect or missing information; information not provided in the correct form). 
Furthermore, other consequences should be noted, because a failure to observe the 
correct form may trigger additional rights, such as withdrawal from the contract or 
termination.56
Clearly, I guess everything depends on the ‘procedural form’ in which stan-
dardized information is presented, on the ‘structural form’ with reference to the 
contents of the contract, on the other formalities for withdrawal: in other words, it 
depends on the function for which the formal requirement comes into play in the 
contract. Hence, given that currently no directive provides for a set of remedies for 
the infringement of formal requirements and Member State do not provide common 
principles and rules for it, the infringement is always subordinate to the function of 
form, which – in the end – is related to its traditional meaning in the Member States 
and, to a lesser extent, to the new one in the European Private Law so-called (form of 
the information, or informative form).
In order to preserve the EU Law effet utile, and appropriate, effective, propor-
tionate and dissuasive sanctions (as the directives say), there are different options: 
(a) the contract is not binding, or only some terms are not binding; (b) the inter-
pretation contra proferentem; (c) the nullity of contract; (d) the claim for damages if 
damages can be proved (pre-contractual liability based on the culpa in contrahendo 
principle, with the cause of action either in tort or in contract, depending on the 
national legal system); (e) the unenforceability of the contract; (f) reversion of the 
burden of proof; (g) the prolongation of the withdrawal period as, for example, in 
Article 2:207(1) ACQP.57
Despite appreciation for the effort made by the Acquis group to fill the gaps 
left by the Community law in terms of consequential remedies for violation of the 
form of the information (informative form),58 attention is drawn to the need to 
55 See Acquis Principles 2007, supra n. 19, Comment No. 5 by Arroyo, Pasa & Vaquer, supra n. 45, 
at 43.
56 See Acquis Principles 2007, supra n. 19, authors of the Comments: C. Twigg-Flesner & T.  Wilhelmsson, 
No. 3, at 97.
57 Cf. Pagliantini, supra n. 46, at 99, and Pasa, supra n. 8, at 404 et seq.
58 Omissions which are likewise highlighted in G. Alpa, ‘Gli obblighi informativi precontrat-
tuali nei contratti di investimento finanziario per l’armonizzazione dei modelli regolatori e per 
l’uniformazione delle regole di diritto comune’, Contratto e impresa, fasc. 4–5 (2008), at 889–916. 
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investigate in greater depth the logic underpinning the different protection mech-
anisms.59 If it seems consistent that the extension of the time limit for withdrawal 
should be linked either to the lack of information as a function of the exercise of 
withdrawal or to the lack of ‘written confirmation’ as a formalization subsequent 
to the conclusion of the contract, on the other hand the congruity is doubtful of 
compensation for loss as a remedy that is concurrent with the remedy provided for 
the performance of obligations which the other party could reasonably expect, as a 
consequence of the absence or incorrectness of the information (Article 2:207(3) 
ACQP).60
3.5 Principle of Non-discrimination
Further areas of ‘resistance’61 concern Chapter 3, Articles 3:101 ACQP ff., regarding 
the principle of non-discrimination.62 Criticism is mainly targeted at the remedial 
framework, since the ACQP did not introduce any innovations with respect to Com-
munity measures, and neither did the DCFR, Articles II-2:101 ff. (no class actions 
to protect collective interests). The criticism is precisely that – namely, the lack of 
a set of provisions, such as actions for injunctions to protect collective interests, as 
a disincentive to discriminatory conduct. In fact, a class action would be a decisive 
move in protecting the interests of discriminated persons. However, the literal tenor 
of Articles 3:201–3:202 ACQP would lead the interpreter to believe that only the 
person discriminated against is entitled to other remedies which are apt to undo the 
consequences of the discriminating act or to prevent further discrimination.
This is a consequence of the fact that the ACQP are formulated on the basis of 
the acquis communautaire. Although the Acquis Group has sought to fill some gaps 
left by the existing EC measures (less then twenty directives, a few Regulations and 
the Rome Convention, plus the ECJ interpretations), the ACQP remain mainly based 
on the existing acquis communautaire.
On the differentiation between remedies at national level, with respect to the Community framework 
cf. likewise Pasa, supra n. 8, at 399–451.
59 U. Salanitro, ‘Gli obblighi precontrattuali di informazione: le regole e i rimedi nei principi Acquis’, 
in ed. De Cristofaro, supra n. 10, at 241–263; A. Gianola, L’integrità del consenso dai diritti nazion-
ali al diritto europeo. Immaginando i vizi del XXI secolo (Milano: Giuffrè, 2008), 582 et seq.
60 Remedies that can be supported with reference to the principle of effet util, especially in light of the 
cases ECJ 20 Sep. 2001, C-453/99 Courage Ltd v. Bernard Crehan and Bernard Crehan v. Courage 
Ltd and Others, and ECJ 17 Sep. 2002, C-253/00, Antonio Muñoz y Cia SA, Superior Fruiticola SA v. 
Frumar Ltd, Redbridge Produce Marketing Ltd., as Twigg-Flesner & Wilhelmsson, supra n. 56, 
pointed out, 99 et seq.
61 D. Maffeis, ‘Il divieto di discriminazione’, in ed. De Cristofaro, supra n. 10, at 265–304.
62 Cf. Acquis Principles 2007, supra n. 19, authors of the Comments: S. Leible, S. Navas Navarro, 
J. Pisulinski & F. Zoll, at 105 et seq.
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3.6 Formation
On the topic of contract formation, the Italian doctrinal opinion is decidedly neg-
ative, above all with respect to the ACQP.63 The criticism is twofold. First of all it 
focuses on the structure and topics covered by Chapter 4 ACQP.
It can be noted that Articles 4:105–4.106 ACQP64do not deal with the ‘if, 
where and when’ contractual aspects, but with the establishment of the contents of 
the agreement, which is assumed to already have been validly achieved. Regarding 
Article 4:108 ACQP, on the acknowledgment of receipt,65 another systematic mis-
take has led the ACQP’s compilers to choose to place this provision in Chapter 4, 
on formation. The error is due to the ‘mere linguistic assonance’ between acknowl-
edgment, which identifies only the performance of a duty of communication and 
information, deriving from the principle of good faith, and Bestätigung, which in 
the German legal system defines all the spontaneous procedural acts reproducing 
the contractual intention, which has already been given, aimed at specifying its full 
workability and capable of giving rise, in certain circumstances (i.e., silence of the 
recipient) to a particular procedure for the execution of the contract.66
Secondly, the Italian commentator criticizes the contents of this Chapter 4 
ACQP, emphasizing that the only references relevant to the subject of contract for-
mation are so obvious – such a truism – that they generate a completely negative 
opinion: ‘the final product satisfies no one and it is to be hoped that the authors 
change job’.67 In other words, these rules on contract formation are so self-evident 
to be considered useless. Specifically, the comments refer to the contents of Article 
4:107 ACQP on the binding force of unilateral promises,68 the content and  wording 
63 F. Addis, ‘La formazione dell’accordo’, in ed. De Cristofaro, supra n. 10, at 305–349; the same essay 
is also published in Obbligazioni e contratti, fasc. 1 (2009), at 8–17.
64 Cf. Acquis Principles 2007, supra n. 19, author of the Comments: R. Schulze, at 140 et seq.
Articles renumbered respectively as Arts 4:107–4:108 ACQP (with wording slightly changed) 
in the second volume of the Acquis Principles 2009, supra n. 19.
65 Cf. Acquis Principles 2007, supra n. 19, authors of the Comments: S. Leible, J. Pisulinski & F. Zoll; 
see Comment No. 5, at 153, who, not by chance, say that the remedies provided by (previous) Art. 
4:108 ACQP mirror the system of remedies for the violation of pre-contractual information duties, 
Art. 2:207 ACQP; indeed, the duty to acknowledge the receipt of an offer or acceptance may be con-
sidered as a specific kind of information duty applicable in the phase of contract formation. There-
fore it is here, among the pre-contractual duties, that this provision could have been collocated, 
according to Addis.
Art. 4:108 ACQP has been renumbered, with major reformulation, as Art. 4:110, in the sec-
ond volume of the Acquis Principles 2009, supra n. 19.
66 Addis, supra n. 63, at 324.
67 Addis, supra n. 63, at 313 and at 349. Also, to the same purpose, M. V. De Giorgi, ‘Principi, Acquis 
e altro’, Europa e diritto privato, fasc. 3 (2008), at 649–653.
68 See Acquis Principles 2007, supra n. 19, Comment No. 8 by Schulze, supra n. 64, at 150.
Art. 4:107 ACQP has been renumbered, without changes, as Art. 4:109 in the second vol-
ume of the Acquis Principles 2009, supra n. 19.
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of which differ from Article II-4:301 DCFR on the requirements for a unilateral 
juridical act.
Lastly, the criticism focuses on Articles 4:101–4:102 ACQP, where a uni-
lateral promise opens a ‘particular’ procedure for the formation of the contract, 
because the theoretical prospect is ‘restricted’, reducing the modalities of forma-
tion of the contract to the offer/acceptance exchange. The prescriptive effect of this 
article is ‘non-existent’, it is ‘useless or innocuous’69 because, unlike the effects of 
Article 2:103 PECL and Article II-4:101 DCFR, the defining features of a ‘sufficient 
 agreement’ are not stated.70 The unilateral promise is only defined in the  negative, 
with regard to the contract, whereas it would have been preferable to opt for a notion 
of the contract which reflects the outcome of a formative procedure based on a range 
of different mechanisms, not only characterized by the ‘magical meeting of wills’.71 
According to Addis, this ‘return to the past’ does not seem to have been tempered 
by Article 4:102(2) ACQP, which only refers to the possibility that the contract 
may be concluded in a way that differs from the offer/acceptance scheme but pro-
vides no regulation for contractual schemes, which differ from those centred on the 
exchange of declarations, such as, for example, ‘acceptance by conduct’ (see  Article 
II-4:205(2)(3) DCFR), or ‘formal confirmation between businesses’ (see Article 
II-4:210 DCFR). The concrete result is that the provision has no prescriptive weight 
and that the relevance given to the hypothesis that a contract can be concluded 
through the traditional mechanism of offer and acceptance amounts to ignoring the 
fact that the conclusion of contract may take place by other means.
3.7 Right of Withdrawal
There are no less than three Italian studies on the right of withdrawal.72
The first commentary73 starts on a linguistic note, with the comment that 
the Italian translation of the ACQP uses the term ‘recesso’ (withdrawal), whereas 
the German one uses the term ‘Widerruf’ or ‘revoca’ (revocation), instead of ‘Rück-
tritt’; however, it should be noted that the term ‘Widerruf’ itself, in § 130 BGB, 
has the meaning of ‘revoca’, whereas in §§ 355–359 BGB governing contracts with 
69 Thus, literally, Addis, supra n. 63, at 330.
70 Although to be fair, the authors of the ACQP are aware of the omission, since in the Acquis Princi-
ples 2007, supra n. 19, sub ‘Explanation’ No. 9 by Schulze, reference is made to just this issue (supra 
n. 64, at 132).
71 Thus Addis, supra n. 63, at 327. Critical of the notion of contract which emerges from the DCFR 
(Arts II-1:103(2) and II-1:105) likewise G. Alpa, ‘Autonomia delle parti e libertà contrattuale oggi’, 
Rivista critica del diritto privato, fasc. 4 (2008), at 571–603.
72 G. De Cristofaro, ‘La disciplina unitaria del ‘diritto di recesso’: ambito di applicazione struttura e 
contenuti essenziali’, at 351–390; E. Bargelli, ‘Gli effetti del recesso nei principi Acquis del diritto 
comunitario dei contratti’, at 391–417; R. Volante, ‘Recesso del consumatore e contratti collegati’, 
at 419–442: all in ed. De Cristofaro, supra n. 10.
73 De Cristofaro, ‘La disciplina unitaria del diritto di recesso (…)’, supra n. 72, at 351.
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 consumers, it means ‘recesso’.74 Therefore, I do not think we are dealing here with a 
‘radically different option’ at the conceptual level.
Having underlined that Chapter 5 ACQP ought to be reformulated in the 
light of Directive No. 2008/48 and Directive No. 2008/122 and the indications 
emerging from the Proposal of the Commission on a Consumer Rights Directive,75 
the  commentary goes on to criticize76 the overarching nature of the jus poentiendi. 
According to De Cristofaro, this should constitute a lex specialis, rather than be 
generalized, as envisaged in the DCFR. The latter has in fact included the general 
framework on withdrawal (Articles II-5:101–106 DCFR and Articles II-5:201–202 
DCFR) in Book II (dealing with ‘contracts and other juridical acts’), extending it to 
all contracts (not only B2C), so that the right of withdrawal is available to all parties 
(and not just to consumers, as it is in the ACQP). This last comment on the ACQP 
is not precise, however, given that Articles 5:101–5:106 ACQP are not restricted to 
the field of consumer protection, as the authors of Article 5:101 ACQP have high-
lighted;77 on the other hand, Articles 5:201–5:202 ACQP deal with ‘particular rights 
of withdrawal’ in contracts negotiated away from business premises and timeshare 
contracts.78
The most severe criticism is, however, lodged against the lack of identifica-
tion of the ‘nature’ of the right of withdrawal.
It is only defined negatively: it is not a revocation, nor termination, it is not 
an ordinary withdrawal (Kündigung, different from Rücktritt) understood as a rem-
edy for non-performance or as a remedy for the frustration of a contract. The party 
is also entitled to exercise its right of withdrawal where the contract is void or where 
the obligations to perform have lapsed for other reasons (e.g., annulment, rescission 
by one of the parties79); however, the Italian commentator believes this solution is 
not correct.80
Furthermore, the ACQP are not clear on the reason justifying a right of with-
drawal of this type, which interferes with the mechanisms of contract formation, as 
74 Cf. B. Pasa, ‘Diritto contrattuale europeo e inconsistenza terminologica’, in Diritto contrattuale 
europeo tra direttive comunitarie e trasposizioni nazionali, eds B. Pasa, P. Rossi & M. Weitenberg 
(Torino: Giappichelli, 2007), 3–31, at 15.
75 COM (2008) 614/3, of 8 Oct. 2008.
76 As previously Jansen & Zimmermann, supra n. 33, at 116.
77 See Acquis Principles 2007, supra n. 19, Comments by P. Møgelvang-Hansen, E. Terryn & R. 
Schulze, No. 9, at 159.
78 Renumbered, with wording slightly changed, as Art. 5:A-01 and Arts 5:C-01–5:C-02 in the second 
volume of the Acquis Principles 2009, supra n. 19.
79 See Acquis Principles 2007, supra n. 19, Comment No. 10 by Møgelvang-Hansen, Terryn & Schulze, 
supra n. 77, at 160.
80 De Cristofaro, ‘La disciplina unitaria del diritto di recesso (…)’, supra n. 72, at 377.
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it is available even before the agreement has been reached;81 in such a case, it is a 
right to deprive a contractual declaration of its legal effects (i.e., it coincides with 
the revocation of the offer).
It is said, by the authors of Article 5:101 ACQP,82 that ‘the application of com-
mon rules with regard to the exercise and effects of the various rights of withdrawal 
is based on the common features of these rights’. However, there are at least three 
types of rules on withdrawal (set out in the comments on the ACQP themselves): one 
with regard to the intrinsic complexity of the contents of B2C contracts, another 
concerning the special features of various means of communication, and finally the 
third, arising out of particular conditions and circumstances such as the nature and 
characteristics of the place in which the party declares her/his contractual intention. 
Therefore, the Italian commentator thinks that it is not correct to establish a com-
mon basis for those three sets of rules.83
The consumer-oriented basis of Articles 5:102–5:106 ACQP is approved, 
although here the most serious omission, according to Italian authors, is the absence 
of rules regulating the distribution of the burden of proof and evidence; however, 
such rules are not absent since, as noted above, the principle of freedom of form 
applies to the ways of communicating (and thus proving) withdrawal.
The rationalization of the chaotic set of rules on the dies a quo of time lim-
its for the activation of the jus poenitendi laid down in the five directives which 
traditionally provide for them is applauded. A main period of fourteen days and a 
maximum time limit of one year, which runs from the signing of the contract,84 are 
considered to be acceptable, by contrast with the existing rules. However, by virtue 
of the ‘Rome I’ Regulation (No. 593/2008), the conclusion of the contract is deter-
mined by the national rules of conflict, thus – once again – there are diverging (not 
common!) rules.
81 According to an authoritative source (Castronovo, supra n. 12, at 285): ‘The right of withdrawal 
from the contract risks undermining the single legitimation represented by the autonomy of the 
party which, once exercised, results in a tie from which it is impossible to disengage. This right 
should only be allowed in situations capable of justifying what would otherwise be a “destructive 
deviation from the freedom to contract”; for these purposes it would be preferable to frame with-
drawal in terms of contract formation rather than in terms of performance. This is feasible, empha-
sising the reasons justifying withdrawal which are not those of destroying the efficacy of the contrac-
tual relationship, but rather for avoiding the performance of contract notwithstanding the reciprocal 
exchange of consent between the parties.’
82 See Acquis Principles 2007, supra n. 19, Comment Nos. 4–5 of Art. 5:101 ACQP by Møgelvang-
 Hansen, Terryn & Schulze, supra n. 77, at 157–158.
83 De Cristofaro agrees with the opinions of Jansen & Zimmermann, supra n. 33, at 1125.
84 See Acquis Principles 2007, supra n. 19, Comment No. 7 by Møgelvang-Hansen, Terryn & Schulze, 
supra n. 77, at 171.
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The formulation ‘does also not apply to’ contained in Article 5:201(4)(5)85 
ACQP seems equally mistaken: according to the Italian commentator, the right of 
withdrawal is also ‘applicable’ to those contracts (letters: a, b, c, d, e, f, e, and finan-
cial services contracts fully performed by both parties), but in point of fact it brings 
about an ‘early extinction’ of the right of withdrawal, at a time prior to the one 
established by the two provisions contained in Articles 5:103 and 2:207 ACQP. This 
is a provision which would moreover conflict with the mandatory nature of the jus 
 poenitendi (Article 5:101 ACQP), since circumstances could occur in which a con-
sumer waives the right to withdraw, as a result of unilateral (external) insistence.
As to the effects of the right of withdrawal,86 it is underlined that the rule 
contained in Article 5:105 ACQP lowers the level of protection in some legal  systems 
(in Sweden and Cyprus, it is allowed for the consumer to retain the goods as an ‘uncon-
ditional gift’ even after the right of withdrawal has been exercised) and it raises it in 
others (in the Italian and Hungarian legal systems, which add a further condition to 
the right of withdrawal, namely that the goods to be returned should not have under-
gone any modification or alteration and that the service has not been performed) 
and that consequently it is seeking an unhappy compromise between protection of 
the consumer and safeguarding the market. Furthermore, this provision leaves two 
issues unresolved: one on the efficacy of withdrawal, which can have merely obliga-
tory or real effects (‘efficacia obbligatoria o reale’); the other as to whether the rule 
of full restitution of the performance can be extended to include long-term contracts 
(each party has to return at its own expense to the other what it received under the 
contract) set out in Article 5:105 ACQP. Moreover, the provision places the risk on 
the seller and liability for damages on the buyer when the damage arises from his/her 
negligence (‘is not liable for damage to the received goods, provided that it exercised 
reasonable care’ Article 5:105(2) ACQP), or for the diminished value that results 
from the normal use of the goods as well, with the relevant burden of proof being on 
the buyer once again. The same party is not liable for the diminished valued of the 
received goods caused by inspecting and testing and when it had not received reason-
able notice of the right of withdrawal (this regime exists under German law).
Finally the Italian author87 shows that Article II-5:105 DCFR incorporates 
the contents of Article 5:105 ACQP but by adding a reference to the restitutionary 
effects of termination. It entails that in the DCFR the effects of the right of with-
drawal are regulated in the section dedicated to the consequences of termination of 
the contractual relationship (Article III-3:501 DCFR). The ‘restitution’ of any ben-
efit received by performance of obligations under the terminated contract remains 
among provisions on unjust enrichment. The DCFR thus makes use of the German 
85 Renumbered as Art. 5:A-02 ACQP in the second volume of the Acquis Principles 2009, supra n. 19.
86 Cf. Bargelli, supra n. 72, at 401.
87 Bargelli, supra n. 72, at 406.
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‘twin track model’, creating a deep divergence in the restitutionary regimes, and pro-
ducing a graft of consumer rights and a new common private law (so-called ‘acquis 
commun’).88 However, the inadequacy of this solution,89 especially with regard to 
the issue of risk distribution in the event of the destruction of specific goods that 
have been delivered in performance of a bilateral contract, ought to have discour-
aged an imitation of the German model.
Still in relation to the DCFR, it is emphasized that it proposes a different solu-
tion, which is more comprehensive with respect to the ACQP framework, although it 
is less favourable to the consumer.
In fact, according to Articles II-5:105(2) and III-3:513(1)
(1) DCFR the recipient is:90 (a) obliged to pay the value (at the time of perfor-
mance) of a benefit which is not transferable or which ceases to be transferable 
before the time when it is to be returned and (b) obliged to pay compensation for any 
reduction in the value of a returnable benefit as a result of a change in the condition 
of the benefit between the time of receipt and the time when it is to be returned.
Furthermore, Article III-3:513(2) DCFR sets out the criterion for calculat-
ing the value of the benefit when restitution cannot take place, which is fixed at the 
price agreed between the parties, adding that, where no price was agreed, the value 
of the benefit is the sum of money that a willing and capable provider and willing and 
capable recipient, aware of any lack of conformity, would lawfully have agreed.
Article III-3:514 DCFR adds another burden of liability on the recipient (who 
could be a consumer!), analogous to that provided for under § 346 Abs. 1, BGB: the 
recipient is obliged to pay a reasonable amount for any use which the recipient makes 
of the benefit, except in so far as the recipient is liable under Article III-3:513(1) 
DCFR in respect of that use.
Finally, liabilities arising after the time when return was due (Article III-3:515 
DCFR) still fall on the recipient/consumer, but in a different way with respect to the 
German model, which places the despatch and costs and risks solely on the business 
party to the contract (§ 357 Abs. 2, BGB).
To conclude, this section dealing with the effects of withdrawal is an auspi-
cious occasion for more general reflection, from a comparative law perspective, 
above all on its effects on the termination of the contract, starting with the German 
model, which to date has been considered the most convincing.91
88 See, for example, in the DCFR Arts II-7:212(2), II-7:303(1); Arts III-1:106(5), III-1:107(3), 
III-3:104(4); Art. IV-G-4:103(5), Art. VII-2:201(2) and Art. VII-7:101.
89 As has been demonstrated by German legal scholars largely cited in the essay by Bargelli, supra 
n. 72, at 410.
90 Of course this is the general rule, but there are some exceptions to the rule: see Art. III-3:513 
(2)(3)(4) DCFR.
91 Bargelli, supra n. 72, at 417.
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Another issue must be highlighted. Another Italian writer92 has criticized 
the consumer exercise of the right of withdrawal in linked contracts (Article 
5:106 ACQP).93 In his opinion, the concept of ‘economic unit’ accepted in the 
ACQP (which stems from German Law) is a vague notion. It would be prefer-
able to replace it with the notion of ‘commercial unit’ introduced by Directive 
No. 2008/48 (after the first volume of the ACQPs was published94). Moreover, 
the ACQP rule does not consider the exceptional nature of the case of credit con-
tracts used for acquiring real property, which is, indeed, outside the scope of 
 Article 5:106 ACQP. It is not possible to withdraw from a mortgage  arrangement 
in respect of real property, nor is the buyer permitted to bring a legal action 
against the bank or the lending institution for non-performance or incomplete 
performance on the seller’s part.
3.8 Non-negotiated Terms
Concerning non-negotiated terms, the Italian commentary95 emphasizes, first of 
all, a structural difference between the DCFR and Chapter 6 ACQP. Articles II-9:
404–9:406 DCFR, in point of fact, do not include the regimen governing non-nego-
tiated terms within a single chapter or section, but differentiate three contractual 
types: (1) the meaning of unfair in contracts between a business and a consumer 
(B2C); (2) the meaning of unfair in contracts between businesses (B2B); and (3) the 
meaning of unfair in contracts between non-business parties (P2P).
Passing on to the analysis of the rules contained in the ACQP,96 the Italian 
commentary regards the contents of Article 6:201 ACQP with disfavour.97 The rule 
concerning the inclusion of non-negotiated terms into a contract, which is applica-
ble also to B2B contracts,98 goes beyond the acquis communautaire, and may raise 
political issues. The drafters of the ACQP justified this by stating that it seemed pref-
erable, in order not to fall back from PECL and CISG,99 but the PECL are not, in the 
92 Volante, supra n. 72, at 420 et seq.
93 See Acquis Principles 2007, supra n. 19, Comments by Møgelvang-Hansen, Terryn & Schulze, supra 
n. 77, at 186 et seq.
94 However in the second volume of the Acquis Principles 2009, supra n. 19, it appears the same con-
cept of ‘economic unit’: see the new volume, at 269.
95 M. Maugeri, ‘Clausole non oggetto di trattativa individuale: l’ambito di applicazione del sesto capi-
tolo dei Principi Acquis’, in ed. De Cristofaro, supra n. 10, at 443–457.
96 Cf. Acquis Principles 2007, supra n. 19, authors of the Comments: Pfeiffer & Ebers, supra n. 27, at 
213 et seq.
97 Pfeiffer & Ebers, supra n. 27, at 221 et seq.
98 And to all contracts, such as para. (3); stricter rules have to apply for B2C contracts, such as 
para. (4).
99 See Comment Nos 7–8 by Pfeiffer & Ebers, supra n. 27, at 223.
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opinion of the commentator, an integral part of the acquis and the reference to CISG 
is not conclusive.100
According to other commentators, however, a positive innovation is brought 
in by Article 2:206 ACQP101 to read as a combined measure with Article 6:201 
ACQP, cited above: any information (included in non-negotiated terms) has to be 
clear and precise and expressed in plain and intelligible language, so as not to hide 
the significance of a combination of interests which are unfavourable to the con-
sumer (principle of transparency). This allows for monitoring of the contents of 
the contract102 (e.g., subject matter and price), in cases where the wording of the 
contract is ambiguous or obscure.103 In the ACQP the lack of transparency and 
unfairness are combined so as to form a whole, but this is not true for the DCFR; 
consequently the remedies available in relation to these two items are disappoint-
ingly different: under Article 6:306 ACQP the terms are not binding, whereas under 
Article II-9:407 DCFR the terms are unfair only if they are not drafted in plain and 
intelligible language.
The rule under Article 6:301 ACQP, which is also applicable to B2B contracts, 
is also not given approval by the Italian commentator,104 on the basis that it is quite 
arbitrary to cite only the legislation of some countries,105 where there are general 
clauses which provide for a content review of standard terms (unfairness test) which 
do not merely apply to B2C contracts, but also to B2B contracts. Such that the ACQP 
are ‘constrained’ to concede a weaker protection to business (based on the parameter 
of ‘gross deviation from good commercial practice’) in order to respect the traditions 
of other legal systems too. There might instead have been a careful consideration of 
the idea of ‘relevant market power’, where the contract terms constitute the means 
by which the powerful contracting party abuses its dominant position and hence 
the issue of unfairness of the terms should have been analysed also with respect to 
 Article 82 EC Treaty.
Article 6:301 ACQP, on the other hand, is regarded with particular favour106 
for the innovative definition of unfairness that it introduces: a term is considered 
unfair if it disadvantages the other party (‘disadvantage’ to be taken as indicating 
a combination of interests which are disadvantageous to the consumer). This is the 
100 Maugeri, supra n. 95, at 450.
101 Cf. Acquis Principles 2007, supra n. 19, Twigg-Flesner & Wilhelmsson, supra n. 56, at 95. As we 
said, the article has been renumbered and it is now Art. 2:204 ACQP.
102 Cf. Pasa, supra n. 8, at 257 et seq.
103 M. Meli, ‘Trasparenza e vessatorietà delle clausole nei contratti per adesione’, in ed. De Cristofaro, 
supra n. 10, 459–486, at 481.
104 Maugeri, supra n. 95, at 453. See also the perplexities expressed in the Acquis Principles 2007, 
supra n. 19, Comment No. 5 by Pfeiffer & Ebers, supra n. 27, at 215.
105 Estonia, Lithuania, Austria, Germany, Portugal, Slovenia, the Netherlands. See Pfeiffer & Ebers, 
supra n. 27, Comment No. 7, at 236.
106 Meli, supra n. 103, at 470.
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key element of the definition, whether it comes about contrary to the requirement of 
good faith, or whether it produces a significant imbalance in the rights and obliga-
tions of the parties under the contract.
There is a further innovation in Articles 6:304 and 6:305 ACQP: the two 
lists, which are not exhaustive, are a point of reference for all the legal systems 
which have not transposed the annex of Directive No. 93/13. However, the inad-
equacy of the new reorganization of subject matter is demonstrated by the failure 
to identify a body which is competent to adjudicate the question of unfairness, inte-
grating those lists of unfair terms, given that the ECJ has declared itself to be the 
least suitable organ to carry out this evaluation on the merits of the unfairness of 
the terms.107
3.9 Performance of Obligations
Chapter 7 ACQP,108 concerning the performance of obligations, according to Ital-
ian commentary assembles scanty statements dealt with in the comments written by 
the compilers of the ACQP, where the use of the English language has not been par-
ticularly productive.109
Article 7:101 ACQP (the debtor’s duty of performance) and Article 7:102 
ACQP (the creditor’s good faith in the exercise of rights) demonstrate, according to 
the Italian commentator, a conception of the duty to perform the obligation which 
reflects values (such as good faith), as a function of protecting the legal position of 
individuals. However, it would have been better to formulate a single rule for both 
debtor and creditor, as Article 1.201 PECL does.110
Furthermore, still in the view of the Italian commentator, to consider  Article 
7:102 ACQP as a general rule preventing the abus de droit which determines the 
limits of rights arising form different sources,111 it would be without  foundation 
107 Meli, supra n. 103, at 468, who recalls ECJ 1 Apr. 2004, C-237/02, Freiburger Kommunalbauten 
GmbH Baugesellschaft & Co. KG v. Ludger Hofstetter and Ulrike Hofstetter.
108 Cf. Acquis Principles 2007, supra n. 19, authors of the Comments: Aubert de Vincelles, Mach-
nikowski, Pisulinski, Rochfeld, Szpunar & Zoll, supra n. 36, at 255 et seq.
109 A. Ciatti, ‘La disciplina dell’adempimento dell’obbligazione’, in ed. De Cristofaro, supra n. 10, at 
487–507, at 489. Here the author criticizes the Terminology Group (within the Acquis Group), in 
which no jurists who were native speakers of English took part.
110 However, see Acquis Principle 2007, supra n. 19, Comment No. 4 by Aubert de Vincelles, 
 Machnikowski, Pisulinski, Rochfeld, Szpunar & Zoll, supra n. 36, at 263: ‘One can argue 
whether this rule should be combined with Art. 7:101 ACPQ, to form one provision. This is a 
question of presentation rather than a political issue. Art. 7:101 ACQP governs duties of the 
debtor, Art. 7:102 ACQP of the creditor. The nature of the creditor’s duties is not the same as the 
duties of the debtor. They only have a supportive function in order to efficiently reach the aims 
of the obligation. Therefore the separation of the duties and their distribution over two articles 
is  justified.’
111 See Comment No. 6 by Aubert de Vincelles, Machnikowski, Pisulinski, Rochfeld, Szpunar & Zoll, 
supra n. 36, at 264.
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in the acquis communautaire. The notion of abus de droit has been invoked in 
the ACQP probably without full awareness of the implications which could derive 
from it.112
Article 7:103 ACQP codifies the duty of loyalty, whereas Article 7:104 ACQP 
codifies the duty to cooperate. Criticism centres not on these principles as such, 
but rather on the comments by the compliers of the ACQP,113 which, stretching the 
interpretation, find in them a European Law of Contracts based on a ‘cooperative 
legal ethic’ and ‘contractual altruism’. This reveals, in the commentator’s view, the 
‘decidedly slanted’ political stance of the Acquis group. In addition, he continues, 
honeste agere (the honest commercial practices) in business relationships have little 
to do with the so-called ‘battle for the socialization of contract law’ evoked by some 
European scholars.114
All this would give rise to an uncontrolled multiplicity of concepts. It would 
have been better to clarify the relationship between the duty to cooperate and 
good faith, but what is said about this is merely that the extent of the cooperation 
is limited by the objective criterion of ‘reasonable expectations’. A debtor performs 
his/her obligations in order to meet the reasonable expectations of the creditor, 
where reasonableness depends on the nature and purpose of the contract, on the 
facts and circumstances of the case, on usages, customs and practices. As regards 
loyalty, the idea of ‘altruism in specific kinds of contractual relationships’ does not 
seem to find support in the acquis communautaire, where loyalty is nearer to consis-
tent conduct, according to the ancient legal maxim, prohibiting venire contra factum 
proprium – no one may set himself in contradiction to his/her own previous conduct 
if another person has already relied on that previous conduct.
Finally, the ACQP compilers concede that the acquis have omissions regard-
ing time and place of performance: the guidance given to the interpreter is that if 
the contract does not fix the time of performance, the debtor must perform ‘without 
undue delay’ (Article7:201 ACQP) or, according to a second formulation adopted in 
the DCFR, ‘within a reasonable time after it arises’ (Article III-2:102 DCFR). How-
ever, regarding the place of performance, the acquis communautaire do not provide 
a sufficient basis for formulating rules, and the gap is to be filled taking a ‘grey rule’ 
from the DCFR. Article III-2:101 DCFR says that in the case of monetary obligation, 
the place will be the creditor’s place of business; in the case of any other obligation, 
the debtor’s place of business.
112 Ciatti, supra n. 109, at 501.
113 Edited, as mentioned supra, by Aubert de Vincelles, Machnikowski, Pisulinski, Rochfeld, Szpunar & 
Zoll, supra n. 36, at 257 et seq.
114 The implicit reference is to M.W. Hesselink, ‘The Horizontal Effect of Social Rights in European 
Contract Law’ (27 Feb. 2002), available at SSRN <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1098923>, and then to 
the Study Group on Social Justice in European Private Law: see the ‘Manifesto’ in European Law 
Journal, 2004, at 653–674.
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3.10 Non-performance
Chapter 8 ACQP115 supplies general provisions on remedies and opens with a wide 
definition of non-performance, which includes any failure to perform an obligation, 
including delayed performance, defective performance and failure to cooperate in 
order to give full effect to the obligation (Article 8:101 ACQP). The ACQP therefore 
impose a strict contractual liability rule (in conformity with CISG, PECL and Unid-
roit, but differing from the BGB, which even after the reform of § 267 makes com-
pensation dependent on establishing the debtor’s liability on the basis of malicious 
or negligent behaviour of the wrongdoer).
Every failure to perform an obligation, including delay in performance, fig-
ures as non-performance under Article 8:101 ACQP, which provides for compen-
sation for contractual damages. One deduces from this article, therefore, a strict 
liability principle governing non-performance, where the fault of the debtor is rel-
evant only to the duty to compensate as Article 8:401 ACQP provides, on the right 
to damages:
(1) The creditor is entitled to damages for loss caused by non-performance of 
an obligation, unless such non-performance is excused. (2) Non-performance is 
excused if it is due to circumstances beyond the control of the debtor and of any 
persons engaged by the debtor for performing this obligation, provided that the 
consequences of those circumstances could not have been avoided even if all due 
care had been exercised.116
Thus a consistent body of rules has been achieved, which include the so-called 
‘twin track’ rules, connoting, for example, the Italian system, in which, on the one 
hand, the debtor has the chance to free himself/herself from the consequences of 
non- performance, by offering exculpatory evidence (prova liberatoria in Italian) 
( Articles 1218 and 1453 Italian CC) and, on the other, the impossibility to render 
the  performance due to the discharge from liability, if it falls outside the debtor’s 
sphere of risk (Article 1256 Italian CC).117
115 This Ch. 8 was not included in the first publication of the ACQP, supra n. 19, to which reference has 
been made up to now; it was available online at <www.acquis-group.org/>, without comments. The 
full version of ACQP is now available (as we already said) in the second volume, supra n. 19, Prin-
ciples of the Existing EC Contract Law (Acquis Principles). Contract II. General Provisions, Delivery 
of Goods, Package Travel and Payment Services, edited by the Research Group on the Existing EC 
Private Law (Acquis Group) (Munich: Sellier, 2009). See in this second volume Comments to Ch. 8 
by P. Machnikowski & M. Szpunar, at 408–426.
116 The section on ‘Damages’, in the second volume of the ACQP, supra, was written by U. Magnus: see 
his comments and explanations at 427–447.
117 R. Calvo, ‘Le conseguenze dell’inadempimento: esatto adempimento, riduzione del prezzo e risoluz-
ione del contratto’, in ed. De Cristofaro, supra n. 10, 509–532, at 525.
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Article 8:401(2) ACQP, however, represents an exception: non-performance 
is excused if it is due to circumstances beyond the control of the debtor and of any 
persons engaged by the debtor for performing this obligation, provided that the con-
sequences of those circumstances could not have been avoided even if all due care 
had been exercised.
This raises the question whether only cases of physical impossibility are 
included or other impediments too;118 in other words, to what extent the con-
tract liability rule is actually one of strict liability. The ACQP, according to the 
Italian commentator, support strict liability, but it is not an absolute rule:119 
although performance is physically possible, it may in fact be practically impos-
sible (because of exorbitant cost, for example) due to circumstances outside the 
debtor’s control and in relation to the contractual commitments undertaken by 
the debtor.
Another Italian comment120 concerns the extra-textual integration of the 
contract, which is triggered in the case of lack of cooperation. The spirit of solidar-
ity, says the author, can be evidenced in Article 8:201(2) ACQP, a particularly origi-
nal provision. It concerns a ‘grey rule’ copied from Article III-3:301 DCFR:
Where the creditor has not yet performed the reciprocal obligation for which pay-
ment will be due and it is clear that the debtor in the monetary obligation will 
be unwilling to receive performance, the creditor may nonetheless proceed with 
performance and may recover payment unless: (a) the creditor could have made a 
reasonable substitute transaction without significant effort or expense; or (b) per-
formance would be unreasonable in the circumstances.
The creditor cannot proceed with performance and recover payment when s/he 
could have made a reasonable substitute transaction, without significant effort or 
expense, or when performance would be unreasonable in the circumstances, in all 
the cases it is clear that the debtor in the monetary obligation will be unwilling to 
receive performance.
The substitute transaction must not incur significant costs at the expense 
of the creditor: it serves to create new business opportunities by reintroducing the 
goods or services into the distribution cycle, when the debtor is unwilling to receive 
them. But the point which needs clarifying remains: when is s/he not in a position 
to receive them? Does it depend on supervening events or those which predate the 
agreement, but unknown to the parties? We are a step away from the frustration 
118 A. D’Adda, ‘Principi Acquis e disciplina delle conseguenze dell’inadempimento: il risarcimento del 
danno contrattuale’, in ed. De Cristofaro, supra n. 10, at 533–558.
119 D’Adda, supra n. 118, at 539.
120 Calvo, supra n. 117, at 509–532.
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theory (well known in all European legal systems, teoría de la Previsión/ presup-
posizione/ presuposición/Voraussetzung), where an unforeseen event undermines a 
party’s principal purpose for entering into a contract, and both parties knew of this 
principal purpose at the time the contract was made. The supervening event which 
nullifies the contractual basis of the agreement imposes not the discharge of the 
contract, but a substitute transaction. If the creditor does not put the goods back 
into the market, s/he loses the right to ask for payment of the sum due to him/her 
by the other party. An alternative rule could be to recognize a right of withdrawal for 
the creditor of a non-monetary obligation, save for a duty to indemnify the debtor 
for expenses already incurred where such losses cannot be covered by the substitute 
transaction.121
Article 8:202 ACQP is also a grey rule taken from Article III-3:302 DCFR. 
The creditor is entitled to enforce specific performance of an obligation other than 
one to pay money.
The choice of remedy is for the creditor, in line with the acquis commu-
nautaire, which is based upon Directive No. 1999/44 (Article 8:301 ACQP), but 
the novel feature is that the ACQP construct the restituito in integrum as an ordi-
nary action available in contract law. Article 8:202(4) ACQP once more invokes 
lack of cooperation, in connection with the notion of ‘avoidable loss’ of the credi-
tor: ‘The creditor cannot recover damages for loss or a stipulated payment for non-
 performance to the extent that the creditor has increased the loss or the amount of 
the payment by insisting unreasonably on specific performance in circumstances 
where the creditor could have made a reasonable substitute transaction without sig-
nificant effort or expense.’
Further causes for concern from Italian scholars’ standpoint relate to Article 
8:301 ACQP, in relation to remedies, because it provides grounds both for termina-
tion of the contract and for reduction (actio quanti minoris).
The first comment concerns the fact that the creditor may reduce his/her own 
performance appropriately without going to court, as in the German case (§ 441 
BGB) or the CISG (Article 50), but differing from the Italian system, for example, 
where the intervention of the court is always required (Article 1492 Italian CC and 
Article 130(7) Italian Consumer Code).
The creditor, therefore, has these alternatives: to reduce his/her own perfor-
mance appropriately, or to terminate the contract: (a) if the creditor has no right to 
performance or cure under section 2 (‘performance and cure of non-performance’); 
or (b) if the debtor has not provided the remedy under section 2 above, within a rea-
sonable time. Finally, the creditor is not entitled to terminate the contract if the 
debtor’s failure to perform amounts to a minor non-performance.
121 Calvo, supra n. 117, at 524.
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A hierarchical criterion in the choice of remedy mentioned above is inserted 
here, non-performance and minor non-performance, but this represents an improve-
ment over the acquis communautaire. Article 8:301(2) ACQP provides that not-
withstanding paragraph (1) quoted above, the creditor is entitled to terminate the 
 contract for non-performance if the creditor cannot be reasonably expected to be 
bound by the contract, in particular because of the kind of non-performance or 
because of the nature of the obligation.
It is possible, therefore, to terminate immediately, even if full performance is 
theoretically possible, when non-performance is such as to lead the creditor to lose 
the trust s/he has placed in the reliability or competence of the debtor.
Article 8:301(3) ACQP provides for partial termination as well: the creditor 
can terminate the contract under paragraph (1) quoted above, only with respect to 
that part which is affected by non-performance, unless partial performance is of no 
utility to the creditor.
The remedies therefore operate according to the simplified rules (in imita-
tion of the German solution based in the BGB and in the Vienna Convention) under 
Article 8:302 ACQP, a grey rule taken from Article III-3:507(1) DCFR: ‘A right to 
terminate under this section is exercised by notice to the debtor.’ It means outside 
a judicial process and on the unilateral initiative of the creditor, within a reasonable 
time. The termination of the contract takes effect through the declaration of the 
party which has the right to do so, which brings the right to terminate close to the 
right of withdrawal.122 However, the ACQP do not accept Article III-3:508(3) DCFR 
as a grey rule, so that if the notice of termination is not issued within a reasonable 
time after the right has arisen, the creditor loses his/her right to terminate. This 
provision of the DCFR introduces an exception in favour of the consumer/debtor, 
who does not lose his/her right to terminate.
From what has been set out so far, in the way the ACQP and the DCFR are 
organized, there is an entitlement to damages without fault; however, under Article 
8:401 ACQP the creditor is entitled to damages for loss caused by non-performance 
of an obligation which actually occurred to the creditor as a consequence of the non-
performance.123 Without losses, in principle no damages are due. Actual loss must 
be proved – damages for pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses – in line with the Civil 
law tradition, while the Common law doctrines, which permit claims for nominal 
damages (actionable on proof of breach of contract) alongside consequential loss, 
seem, on the other hand, to have been rejected.124
122 Calvo, supra n. 117, at 530.
123 D’Adda, supra n. 118, at 539.
124 Despite the fact that the ECJ 7 Feb. 1990, Case C-343/87 Culin v. Commission, seems to have 
allowed the compensatory remedy without proof of loss (nominal damages), subject to certain reser-
vations.
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A corollary to limiting compensation to proof of actual loss is that punitive 
damages have no place in Article 8:402 ACQP. The clear choice in the ACQP is in 
favour of the function of compensation, despite the fact that in connection with the 
prohibition on discrimination under Article 3:202(2) ACQP, it is stated that the 
deterrent effect of remedies may be taken into account.
Loss is therefore the damage consequent upon non-performance. Under 
 Article 8:402 ACQP, it is the payment of the amount necessary to put the creditor into 
the position in which it would have been if the obligation had been duly performed; 
a compensatory principle underlying the basic rule of reparation in tort law too (see 
Article VI-6:101 DCFR125), which also excludes punitive or exemplary damages.
Article 8:402 (4) ACQP provides that the notion of damages also covers non-
pecuniary losses (as in the PECL, the Unidroit Principles and the famous ECJ Leitner 
case, C-168/00), but a filter is immediately applied: only to the extent that the obli-
gation includes the protection or satisfaction of ‘non-pecuniary interests’. The Ital-
ian commentator notes with appreciation the caution exercised by the ACQP, which 
reflect modern thinking on the actionability of non-pecuniary losses in contract 
law: risks linked to indiscriminate compensation claims, given that non-pecuniary 
loss always produces an economic enrichment of the claimant. It is the solidarity-
based/satisfactory function of reparation for non-pecuniary loss which can appease 
the victim’s own sense of justice. The interpreter, therefore, needs to ascertain the 
existence of non-pecuniary loss and the direct causal link with the non-performance, 
which will be awarded only if the non-performance includes the protection or sat-
isfaction of non-pecuniary interests or ‘non-material interests’ of the creditor (e.g., 
relaxation, tranquillity, loss of amenity), which indeed look like tortious heads of 
damages for non-economic loss and not contractual ones.
Article 8:403 ACQP provides that damages are reduced or excluded to the 
extent that the creditor wilfully or negligently contributed to the effects of the non-
performance or could have reduced the loss by taking reasonable steps. According to 
the Italian commentator, this is based on the principle of full restitution of the loss, 
and the debtor may also be liable for the consequences of the damage, even if they 
were not foreseeable at the time the contract was concluded.126 This differs from the 
provisions under the DCFR (Articles III-3:704 and III-3:705) where there is a reduc-
tion of loss applying the criterion of the foreseeability of loss at the time the contrac-
tual obligations were undertaken.
125 A comparison of Principles of European Tort Law (2005) written by the European Group on Tort 
Law and the DCFR (1st ed., 2008) was undertaken, for example, by D. Barbierato, ‘Il risarcimento 
del danno. Prospettive di diritto europeo’, Responsabilità civile e previdenza, fasc. 12 (2008), at 
2644–2651.
126 D’Adda, supra n. 118, at 554.
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Under the ACQP, compensation is reduced or denied only if the creditor con-
tributed to the effects of non-performance (contributory negligence) or did not take 
adequate steps, which s/he could reasonably have taken, to mitigate the loss (miti-
gation). The provision regulates both mitigation of damages, which imposes a duty 
on the creditor to take steps to reduce the amount of damages, with the exception 
of reimbursing the necessary costs sustained127 – a concept unknown to Civil law, 
although analogous notions exist,128 according to certain parts of legal scholarship, 
having been garnered from French case law, or from Italian case law under Article 
1227 Italian CC – and contributory negligence by the creditor.
This provision has the positive effect of making the creditor assume some 
responsibility for his/her situation.
4. Concluding Remarks
To sum up, the Italian commentators welcome the promotion of the Europeanization 
of private law through the process of improving greater coherence of EC legislation 
in the areas of consumer and contract law, although they appear to conclude that 
the DCFR and the ACQP fall significantly short of achieving those goals. According 
to the majority of Italian commentators, indeed, the DCFR and the ACQP contents 
show gaps and shortcuts, certainly explicable by the EC’s pointilliste approach to 
legislation, in contrast to other works such as CISG, the Lando Principles and the 
Unidroit Principles, which contain full sets of rules.
With regard to the DCFR, in particular, a number of Italian scholars agree 
that it is a ‘construction site for civil law in Europe’ and ‘a huge opportunity for 
European culture and civil society’.129 Having said that, the DCFR is not ready to 
become the European reference text for civil and contract law. A critical point is that 
the drafting of the DCFR was accompanied by the so-called ‘revision of the consumer 
acquis’ through the action of the Acquis group. Yet, from an ontological perspective, 
it is debateable whether the two operations had to be carried out on parallel tracks, 
notwithstanding a number of logical reasons underlying a comprehensive revision of 
consumer rights based on the principles on which the DCFR is structured.130
Another drawback in connection with this process of ordering and restyl-
ing European law in the field of consumer protection and the law of contracts, in 
the constitutional remit, is that it does not entail a democratic process in the clas-
sical sense: although the policy decisions taken by the working groups involved in 
this process gained support of the majority of the members present and voting in 
127 This latter head of damages is not provided for in the ACQP, but it is under the Unidroit Principles, 
in the PECL and in the DCFR, Art. III-3:705(2): the creditor is entitled to recover any expenses rea-
sonably incurred in attempting to reduce the loss.
128 As a duty to mitigate the prejudicial consequences of non-performance.
129 Bisogni, at 614, and MEDEL, supra n. 11.
130 Cf. Castronovo, supra n. 12, at 288.
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the meetings,131 it is true that the DCFR did not involve the national parliaments 
during the ascendant phase (the formation of these rules) and it hardly involves the 
European Parliament at all. It is probable that the ‘political CFR’ will overcome frag-
mentation and inconsistency by means of a more democratic process.
Finally, for some undisclosed reasons the DCFR has not become such a 
suitable ‘toolbox’ as the Commission expected, given the fact that this informal 
 instrument, with a target-oriented structure, was not even taken into account for 
developing the Proposal for a Consumer Rights Directive.132 However, as the Acquis 
group outlined,133 it is the proposal that has fallen short of achieving the goal of 
promoting the ongoing process of Europeanization of Private Law. It is, first of 
all, debatable that full harmonization promoted by the proposal134 ought to be the 
appropriate instrument135 in light of its doubtful compatibility with the subsidiarity 
and proportionality principles and the consequent reduction in the level of protec-
tion for European consumers that accompanies it. This proposal, moreover, fails to 
provide common framework definitions for EC consumer law, and it further fails to 
create greater coherence within the existing acquis. In this regard, the present inter-
play between EC law and domestic law would be adversely affected if the proposal 
finally became a directive.
131 On the Joint Network CoPECL which had to compile these legal rules and on its legitimation, see 
the summary by Gerhard Dannemann, in particular explaining the legitimacy of the Acquis group 
based on the ‘freedom of research’. Cf. G. Dannemann, at xlvi, in Principles of the Existing EC Con-
tract Law (Acquis Principles). Contract II, supra n. 19.
132 Supra n. 75. As recently highlighted by R. Zimmermann, ‘The Present State of European Private Law’, 
57 American Journal of Comparative Law (2009): 479–512, at 487 et seq. Cf. the definitions of con-
sumer, durable medium, producer; or the duties of information or the withdrawal period; the list of 
standard contract terms, etc.
133 See European Research Group on Existing EC Private Law (Acquis Group), ‘Position Paper on the 
Proposal for a Directive on Consumer Rights’ (2009) Oxford University Comparative Law Forum 3, 
at <ouclf.iuscomp.org>.
134 It should be stressed that the Commission’s proposal for a directive on consumer rights does not 
contain any single reference to the DCFR. As it has been pointed out by the Committee on Legal 
Affairs of the European Parliament (cf. working document 15 Apr. 2009, at 3), this is strange ‘given 
that the whole purpose of the CFR was meant to serve as a toolbox for the Commission when revis-
ing the acquis communautaire in the area of contract law’.
135 Cf. the Opinion of the Committee of the Regions on consumer rights (2009/C 200/14), C 200/76, 
Official Journal 25 Aug. 2009. At point 10, the Committee ‘notes that full harmonisation on a broad 
scale represents a new departure in European consumer protection that does not appear to be strictly 
necessary. Full harmonisation should be considered selectively, i.e., in specific technical cases only, 
where the different national provisions in place up to now are genuinely and demonstrably placing a 
burden on cross-border businesses or represent a substantial obstacle to achieving the four freedoms 
of the European Union’.
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